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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
VIRGIL H. CAMP, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DESERET MUTUAL BENEFIT 
ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents 
Civil No. 15,672 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a breach of an insurance contract and an 
interpretation of certain contract provisions. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was heard by the District Court on Cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, plain-
tiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his 
favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case were stipulated to by counsel at the trial 
of this matter. The question before the trial court was simply an 
interpretation of a contract provision. 
On June 21, 1976, the Plaintiff's 16-year old son, Jeff Camp, was 
severly injured on a trampoline. He is, as a result of the accident, 
3 ~11adr2plegic. (Escobar Depo. at 5) 
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From June 21, 1976 to July 8, 1976, Jeff was in the Cottonwood 
Hospital. From July 8th to October 15, 1976 Jeff was in the Uni-
versity of Utah Medical Center in its physical rehabilitation secti~ 
under the care and supervision of Dr. Pedro Escobar. (Escobar Depo. 
5 and exhibits attached thereto) 
On October 15, 1976, Jeff was released to go home with his 
parents and family. At the time of his discharge, he was given 
certain prescriptions for medication, a course of physical therapy 
with appointments to see his physicians, (see discharge summary 
attached to Dr. Escobar's Deposition) and prescriptions for medical 
equipment: a wheelchair, a specially-equipped van, a hospital bed,a 
commode chair and a bath shelf (See Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibits B, 
C, D, and E). 
Mr. Virgil Camp, the plaintiff, obtained all of these items 
prescribed and recommended by the attending physician. He then 
submitted them to the defendant for payment pursuant to his policy o: 
insurance. (Camp Depo. at 15-18) 
The defendant insurance company paid for all of the items pre-
scribed and recommended except for the specially-equipped van. The 
defendant denied payment on the ground that it was not medical equip· 
ment. (Stewart Depo. at 11). The van was equipped with special equi:' 
ment prescribed and recommended by Jeff 1 s attending physician in oriE' 
to alleviate his physical impairment -- that of a quadriplegic. ~~ 
van contained the following: a refrigeration system to reduce bo~ 
temperature, a citizen 1 s band radio in order to comm,_micate with 
others in the event of an emergency, a hydraulic lift, which would 
transport the boy in his wheelchair from the ground l~~el into the~ 
-~-
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and forward to the front of the van and a special chair for the boy 
to sit in as a driver, hand controls, power steering, power brakes, 
and other controls recommended by the manufacturer of equipment for 
handicapped persons. (Escobar Depo. exhibit D-1 and exhibits B, c; D, 
and E of Plaintiff's Complaint). 
Mr. Camp pursued the matter through the defendant's internal 
appeal procedure and after it was finally denied by the Company at the 
highest level, he commenced this action, alleging a breach of his 
contract with the insurance company. 
The simple issue before this Court is whether or not a specially-
equipped van, prescribed and recommended by his attending physician, 
is medical equipment under the terms of the policy. 
There are no contested issues of material fact and therefore 
Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56, U.R.C.P. was appropriate in this 
matter. It is not disputed that the plaintiff's son is a quadriplegic, 
nor can it be disputed that the defendant refused to pay for the van. 
Finally, it cannot be disputed that Dr. Escobar, the attending physician 
to Jeff Camp, prescribed and recommended that the specially-equipped 
van be obtained. 
Exhibit "D" attached to plaintiff's complaint is a prescription 
for medical equipment. In that exhibit, Dr. Escobar prescribes a van 
with the appropriate special equipment. In addition, he states in 
that prescription that the van is medically necessary. Furthermore, 
1n his letter (exhibit "B" attached to plaintiff's complaint), Dr. 
Sscobar clearly recommends the purchase or rental of the van as 
-3-
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essential to the patient's health and well being. In his deposition, 
Dr. Escobar states that he prescribed the van for Jeff: 
Q. May I ask just one further question. Dr. 
Escobar, did you prescribe for Jeff Camp a van 
equipped with power steering, power brakes, 
automatic transmission, refrigeration, hand 
control system and automatic wheelchair lift and 
a CB radio? 
A. Yes. I think we went over those and mentioned 
the reasons why I had done that. (Deposition of 
Dr. Escobar at page 67) 
The specially equipped van is a Type II benefit under plaintiff's 
insurance policy with defendant and is covered to 80% of the cost: 
Benefits are payable for expenses incurred by you or 
your dependents resulting from bodily injury or 
accident on the basis of 80% of usual, reasonable and 
customary charges for: 
MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT - charges for medical 
supplies and medical equipment prescribed by a physician, 
including oxygen; blood and other fluids to be injected 
into the circulatory system; artificial limbs and 
eyes; casts, splints, trusses, braces, orthopedic 
shoes, crutches, surgical dressings; and rental of 
special medical equipment recommended by a physician, 
such as a wheelchair, hospital-type bed, iron lung or 
oxygen equipment. 
(Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's complaint 
at pages 14 and 15). (Stewart depo. at 15-16) 
(emphasis supplied) 
The contract states that DMBA will pay 80% of the expenses 
incurred by the injury "resulting from bodily injury or sickness". 
One of the expenses detailed are expenses for medical supplies and 
equipmen~. The only requirement for coverage by the company for 
medical equipment is tha~ it be prescribed or recommended by a 
physician and it be incurred as a result of a bodlly injury or sick:' 
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Here the specially-equipped van was both prescribed and re~ded 
as medical equipment for Jeff by the attendinq physician, Dr. Esc~. 
Furthermore, the expense of the van directly relates to a bodily 
injury incurred by the dependant of the insured. Accordingly, UDder 
the express terms of the policy, the van and its expenses are covered. 
Clearly, but for the accident and the subsequent quadriplegic 
condition of Jeff Camp, there would have been no need for a specially-
equipped van containing such necessary items for Jeff's condition, 
such as hydraulic lift, power steering, hand controls, air conditioning 
for his body, power brakes and a CB radio. Accordingly, such equipment 
is necessarily medical equipment, as it relates solely to Jeff's 
condition and injury and is attributable to his medical needs. As it 
was prescribed and recommended by the physician as medical equipment, 
the insurer must provide for 80% of its cost pursuant to the terms of 
the contract. 
ARGU~!ENT 
POINT I 
THE SPECIALLY-EQUIPPED VAN IS COVEP£D 
BY THE EXPRESS TEru1S OF THE CONTRACT 
Plaintiff maintains that in order to qualify for benefits under 
the terms of the contract, it must show the following: 
(a) The expenses occurred as a result of a bodily injury or 
sickness of the insured or dependent of the insured. 
(b) That the medical equipment be prescribed or recommended by a 
~hysician. 
Plaintiff has met those requirements. Jeff is the son of the 
Pl3in~iff and a dependant under the terms of the policy. The expense 
-5-
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of the van was incurred as a result of a bodily injury. A physician 
has prescribed and recol!Ut\ended the van as medical equipment. There· 
fore, the defendant is liable for the cost of the van, failure to~ 
constitutes a breach of contract. In the absence of fraud, Dr. E~~ 
bar's statement that the van is medical equipment is controlling and 
the defendant cannot substitute its own judgment or the judgment of 
anyone else for that of Dr. Escobar. 
In Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp. , 19 U. 2d 2 9 7 4 3, P. 2C. 130 1:' 
this Court faced a similar situation. There an employee maintained 
that he was entitled to total disability benefits under the employer':' 
plan. The employee's physician testified that the employee qualified 
for total disability. The Supreme Court found for the defendant 
employer on the basis of the contract language which stated that the 
determination of total disability was to be made by a doctor designat: 
by the corporation. (That physician stated that the employee was n~ 
totally disabled.) This Court held that where, in the opinion of the 
physician designated by the employer, the employee was not totally 
disabled, it was the duty of the employee to show bad faith, fraud, 
mistake or the like in order to disqualify that opinion. Furthermore, 
to sustain a showing of bad faith, mistake or fraud, the evidence m~ 
establish it by "more than a mere preponderance, it must be overw~~ 
(Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1940) cited with apo: 
in the .~icone case.) 
Here, the contract language states that the expe:-~se for medicai 
equipment prescribed or recommended bv a physician will be covered t: 
the carrier. Dr. Escobar so ,:nescribed and reco;;c'Tiended, and there:c: 
plaintiff has met its burden. Defe'>dant ,:ar1nct cor.tc:-adi-::t the opiol. 
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of Dr. Escobar as to whether or not someone else views the van as not 
being medical equipment. If the insurer desired, it could have stated 
that a physician of its choice would make the determination or that 
certain criteria be met. The defendant failed to do so and is bound by 
the language of the contract. 
POINT II 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS ARE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE INSURER AND A.J."'BIGUITIES 
ARE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE. 
It is a fundamental concept of law that insurance contracts are 
construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Browning 
v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 94 Utah 532, 172 P.2d 1060 (1945). 
In dealing with insurance contracts there are two theories of 
construction: First, if the terms of the policy are unambiguous, 
and second, if the terms of the policy are ambiguous. 
In the first instance, if the terms of the policy are clear and 
unambiguous, then it must be enforced. The relevant clause of defen-
dant's contract has been set forth above. Assuming no ambiguity, 
the insurer must pay 80% of the cost of any item of medical equipment 
prescribed or recommended by a physician. In this case, the specially-
equipped van was both prescribed and recommended by the attending 
physician, Dr. Escobar, as medical equipment necessary for the 
injured patient. (See Exhibits "B" and "D" of Plaintiff's Complaint). 
Furthermore, or. Escobar testified that the van was medical equipment. 
Accordingly, the term medical equipment under a strict construction, 
~ust be construed as in the following case: 
In that part of the contract which relates to 
the "covered" charges for which the defendant 
is liable, defendant employs the word "equip-
-7-
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~ent" _without precise definition. Implicit 
~n th~s use of this work "equipment" is that 
the equipment item be diagnosed by his doctor. 
The air conditioning unit ordered by plaintiff's 
doctor for the purpose of affording plaintiff 
relief from his ailment is embraced in the 
term "equipment" and therefore plaintiff was 
justified in buying the air conditioning unit. 
Kennan v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
the United States, 299 NY Supp. 2d 880, 1969). 
The Kennan case was an action to enforce the contract of 
insurance for payment of necessary equipment under the medical 
insurance policy. Here the term "equipment" is also used without 
precise definition except to limit it to medical equipment, a 
modification clearly implicit in the Kennan case as it refers to 
equipment ordered by the doctor to relieve an ailment or impairment. 
In the case at bar, the specially-equipped van was also ordered 
by the doctor to relieve an ailment or impairment. 
In fact, the language of the contract says " . and 
rental of special medical equipment recommended by a physician 
such as a wheelchair, hospital bed, iron lung or oxygen equipment." 
Nowhere does the defendant limit it to those items but rather 
states that it will pay for "special medical equipment," i.e., 
equipment not normally required. ~herefore a specially equipped 
van for handicapped persons is an item of special medical equipment. 
There is no question that the van prescribed and recommended 
by Dr. Escobar for Jeff was made necessary as a result of the 
injury and therefore, medically necessary to relieve a physical 
impairment. Accordingly, if the term "medical equipment", is 
unambiguous it must be any equipl'1ent prescribed and recommended 
by a physician =or the ?Urpose oz relieving a~ ailment cr impalr-
-t-
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ment, and therefore defendant must extend coverage. 
Alternatively, if there are two different reasonable interpre-
tations of the term "medical equipment," there must be an ambiguity 
in the term "medical equipment" and the following analysis would 
apply: 
In interpreting an insurance policy, courts have 
universally resolved ambiguities, if any there be, 
in a policy strictly against the insurer and in 
favor of the insured. Christensen v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 21 U.2d 194, 196, 443 P.2d 
385 (1968). 
The question of ambiguity then is what is "medical equipment"? 
In the deposition of Mr. Herwin U. Stewart, Vice President of Deseret 
Mutual Benefit Association, Mr. Stewart stated as follows: 
A. All right, Mr. Stewart. It was on the 14th 
then or just prior to the 14th of October, 1976 that 
you becane aware of this claim. What was the 
substance of your reaction to the claim by Mr. Camp? 
A. I felt that the claim clearly was not an eligible 
. . . the claim for a fully equipped van was not an 
eligible claim under the policy. 
Q. What was the basis for that judgment? 
A. That it was not medical equipment. 
Q. Why was it not medical equipment? 
A. An automobile is more generally used for something 
other than medical. Hedical equipment would generally 
be an item of equipment which is used primarily and 
almost exclusively for medical purposes and reasons. 
(Deposition at page 11) 
Q. Before I get onto the other items, so what 
are you saying then is that instead of just setting 
forth a prescription or a recommendation from the 
physician, you are requiring other items to be 
qiven to you by the insured, is that correct? 
-9-
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A. Right. I can think of at least two other 
items that would be required: one is that it be 
medical equipment; and t'\-TO, that it be an eligible 
expense under the policy. 
(Deposition at page 18) 
Q. Because if I understand you correctly, are 
you telling me that if it is medically necessary 
and it is an eligible item of equipment, that it 
becomes medical equipment? Is that correct? 
A. If it's specifically listed as an item of medical 
equipment, such as a wheelchair or a crutch, there's 
nothing further that is required. If it is not spe-
cifically listed, then it must clearly be an item of 
medical equipment. 
(Deposition at page 19) 
Q. Let me just direct the attention to a letter dated 
November 5, 1976, from you to me where you state, and 
I will quote, and I'll admit I am excerpting out 
of the paragraph, but I think it's self-explanatory. 
I'm reading now: "While the committee is sympathetic 
with the desirability for adaptation of Jeffrey to 
a normal life and to the recommendation of his attend-
ing therapist and physicians to retain as much inde-
pendence as possible, the requested equipment is 
considered to be transportation rather than a device 
necessary to sustain life or to medically relieve a 
physical impairment." 
Mr. Bushnell: Let's finish the other sentence. 
Q. All right. "Such transportation equipment is not 
provided for in the medical insurance policy." 
Now, are these two other additional items criteria 
for determining whether or not it is medical equip-
ment, a device necessary to sustain life or to 
medically relieve a physical impairment? (emphasis 
added.) 
A. They would be part of the criteria we would 
consider. (Deposition at pages 25 and 26) (emphasis 
added.) 
-10-
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The defendant has not only admitted that the term is ambiguous, 
by offering a different definition of medical equipment than plaintiff, 
but has placed additional criteria for determining what is medical 
equipment. By the fact that such additional criteria were not set 
forth in the contract and insurance agreement they are void and 
render defendant's position and reliance upon it unsupportable. 
(Fassio v. Montana Physicians' Service, 553 P.2d 998 (Mont.l976)). 
At best, defendant has made the term "medical equipment" a floating 
term to fit whatever the defendant desires to extend or not extend 
coverage to. 
If defendant wished to set forth exactly what is medical 
equipment and limit it to those items, or establish criteria for 
determining what is medical equipment, defendant has an obligation 
to do so or to be held strictly to the terms of the policy: 
The language of these insurance contracts are 
carefully chosen. This was done in the absence 
of the Fassios and used to carefully limit and 
protect the carrier, Hontana Physicians' Service, 
against extended liability. If Montana Physi-
cians' Service wishes to exclude or limit the 
risk contracted for it, then let them do so in 
words that leave no doubt. The law is clear 
that in this jurisdiction that exclusion clauses 
are construed narrowly against the insurer. 
Fassios v. Montana Physicians' Service, 553 P.2d 
998, 1, 000 (Montana, 1976). 
In that case, as here, defendant is in the position of writing the 
terms of the policy. Plaintiff has had no role in drafting this 
document and, should defendant wish to exclude a specially-equipped 
van or should it desire to specifically limit the policy coverage to 
certain items of medical equipment or establish a criteria for 
eli;ibility of "Medical expenses", then it must do so. 
-11-
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In State Farm v. Jacober, 514 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1973), the Califor· 
Supreme Court held that when an exclusionary clause is subject to 
different reasonable meanings, the insured's view prevails: 
For under settled principles so long as coverage is 
available under any reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous clause, the insurer cannot escape liability. 
. . . so long as there is any other reasonable 
interpretation under which recovery would be per-
mitted in the instant case if semantically permissible, 
(an insurance) contract will be given such con- 'r' 
struction as will fairly achieve its object of 
securing indemnity to the insured to the losses to 
which the insurance relates. Id. at 954, 959. ' 
Here, the term "medical equipment" is subject to at least two 
different reasonable interpretations: the plaintiff uses it as any 
equipment prescribed or recommended by the physician that is requirea 
or necessary for the patient as a result of the injury or condition.' 
This is clearly the purpose for which the policy was obtained -- to 
insure against any health or medical expense. But for Jeff's injury, 
the specially-equipped van would not be necessary. Additionally, Dr. 
Escobar stated that in his opinion, the van was medically necessary 
for Jeff. (Dr. Escobar's Deposition at Page 66 and prescription, 
Exhibit "D" to Plaintiff's Complaint). As the Utah Supreme Courthas 
said: 
This jurisdiction, like many others, has declared 
in favor of a liberal construction in favor of 
the insured to accomplish the purpose for which 
the insurance was taken out and the premiums 
paid. Browning, supra at 562. 
Defendant, on the other hand, has viewed medical equipment as: 
(a) something :-1ecessary to sustain life, (Stewart Depo. at 26); (bl 
to medically relieve a physical impairmen~ (Ste•,;art Depo. at 26); s: 
(c) something provided in a hospital to patients in a hospital (Ste'{ 
Depo. at 19). 
-12-
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r 
Under Plaintiff's theory, a specially-equipped van would be an 
eligible expense. In fact, under at least one of defendant's three 
theories, the van would qualify. Defendant states that the item must 
be necessary to "medically relieve a physical impairment". The van 
is clearly there to relieve physical impairment, the loss of the 
hands, legs and other bodily functions from the neck down of Jeff 
Camp. It is exactly the same function as that of a wheelchair which 
defendant admits to cover. 
In evaluating this contention, we begin with the 
fundamental principle that an insurer cannot 
escape its basic duty to insure by means of an 
exclusionary clause that is unclear. As we have 
declared time and again "any exception to the 
performance of the basic underlying obligation 
must be so stated as to clearly apprise the 
insured of its effects". [citations omitted) 
Thus, the burden rests upon the insurer to place 
acceptance and exclusions in clear and unmistakable 
language. [citations omitted) 
The exclusionary clause must be conspicuous, 
plain and clear. [emphasis in original] 
State Farm Mutual v. Jacober, Id. at 958 
Accordingly, defendant has the obligation to set forth its 
contract in clear and unambiguous language. If it does not, then the 
insurer must have the policy construed against it. In this case, as 
there is more than one reasonable construction of the term "medical 
equipment", the construction of the insured must prevail and the 
insurer is liable for the cost of this equipment. 
CONCLUSION 
We need not go into the subject of the advancement of technology 
3~d modern sc1ence. We need not deal with the question of whether or 
-13-
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not a van is the modern replacement of a wheelchair or where this 
ends if the insurance company must pay for this van. 
We are simply dealing with an insurance contract. This contract 
must be construed according to its terms and strictly against the 
insurer in a light most favorable to coverage for the insured. 
Defendant's tortured view of the term "medical equipment" is incon-
sistent with that of the intent of the policy. That is, to provide 
coverage for the insured where, when and if it becomes necessary. 
Here, it does. 
DATED this~ day of _l....::ljf..::."'--·+----' 1977. 
I --- /_ J .. "/: 
THOMAS T. BILLINGS 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
~~ILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief to Dan S. Bushnell and Bruce Finclay, of Kirton, 
McConkie, Boyer & Boyle, attorneys for defendants-respondents, 336 
South Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid this 
~ day of _/_';'1_-...,· 1-----' 1978. 
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